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On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted 52 to 48 percent to leave 
the European Union.1 The vote for “Brexit” sent shockwaves around the 
world, rocking financial markets and rekindling global debates about the 
power of populism and nationalism, as well as the long-term viability of 
the EU. Aside from calling attention to challenges to mainstream liberal 
democracy and international integration, the vote for Brexit also high-
lights the deepening political divides that cut across traditional party 
lines in Britain and now threaten to further destabilize an already crum-
bling two-party system. 
On one level, the shocking result served as a powerful reminder of 
the sheer force of Britain’s entrenched Euroskeptic tradition and of the 
acrimonious splits among the country’s political elite over Britain’s re-
lationship with Europe. But on a deeper level, Brexit should also be 
seen as a symptom of longer-term social changes that have quietly been 
reshaping public opinion, political behavior, and party competition in 
Britain as well as in other Western democracies. What underlying social 
and attitudinal shifts made Brexit possible? To what extent was the vote 
for Brexit driven by the same social forces that fueled the electoral rise 
of the populist, right-wing U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), a party that 
surged to prominence in the decade before the referendum? And what do 
these momentous events reveal more broadly about the state of British 
politics and the divisions in British society?
The social changes that set the stage for Britain’s historic vote to 
leave the EU began decades ago. As we have argued elsewhere, one key 
“bottom-up” driver was a slow but relentless shift in the structure and at-
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titudes of the electorate—the growing dominance of the middle classes 
and of socially liberal university graduates.2 In the 1960s, more than half 
of those with jobs in Britain did manual work, and less than 10 percent 
of the electorate had a university degree. By the 2000s, the working class 
had dwindled to around a fifth of the 
employed electorate, while more 
than a third of voters were graduates. 
These changes gradually altered the 
electoral calculus for the historically 
dominant Labour and Conservative 
parties, whose traditional dividing 
line had been social class. 
When the working classes were 
dominant, Labour could win power 
by mobilizing its core working-class 
support, while the Conservatives had 
to cultivate cross-class appeal. By 
the 1990s, however, the shift in the 
country’s class structure had reversed 
this calculus. Labour was compelled by repeated electoral defeats and a 
shrinking working-class core vote to develop a new cross-class appeal, 
a strategy that was explicitly acknowledged and pursued by Tony Blair, 
who became party leader in 1994. Traditional working-class values and 
ideology were downplayed in Blair’s rebranded “New Labour,” which 
focused instead on building a managerial, centrist image designed to 
appeal to the middle classes. In particular, it sought to attract university-
educated professionals, whose numbers were growing rapidly and whose 
social values on issues such as race, gender, and sexuality were a natural 
fit with the liberal left. This proved hugely successful in the short run, 
handing Labour an unprecedented three successive election victories. 
Yet success came at a price. Between 1997 and 2010, under three suc-
cessive Labour governments, socially conservative, working-class white 
voters with few educational qualifications gradually lost faith in Labour 
as a party that represented them and responded to their concerns. The 
result among these voters was lower turnout, falling identification with 
Labour, and growing disaffection with the political system.3 
This could have provided an opening for the Conservative Party, but 
David Cameron, who became the party’s new leader in 2005, was fo-
cused on building a Conservative recovery by regaining support from 
the growing pool of university graduates and middle-class professionals 
that the party had lost to Blair’s Labour in the 1990s. Working-class 
voters were concentrated in safe Labour constituencies, with daunting 
local majorities and weak local Conservative organizations, and so the 
middle-class suburbs appeared to offer a much more promising path 
back to power. While demographic change increased the electoral incen-
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tive for Labour to focus on middle-class university graduates, enduring 
geographical differences in vote patterns blunted the incentive for the 
Conservatives to respond by seeking the votes of working-class school 
leavers. As a result, white working-class voters were neglected by both 
parties, in a country where, despite recent and rapid demographic chang-
es, the electorate remains overwhelmingly white (87 percent identified 
as such in the 2011 U.K. census). White working-class voters noticed 
the change in the parties’ behavior and reacted accordingly: They grew 
more negative about the traditional parties and the perceived lack of 
responsiveness of the political system.4 Many turned their backs on 
electoral politics altogether, leading to lower turnout among the work-
ing classes and in historically “safe” Labour constituencies, while some 
began to see the extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP) as an 
outlet for their disaffection.5 
A second long-running social change overlapped with these demo-
graphic shifts and magnified their importance—growing value divides 
over national identity, diversity and multiculturalism, and social liber-
alism more generally. Rising social groups such as ethnic minorities, 
graduates, and middle-class professionals hold values that are very dif-
ferent from those of the once-dominant but now fast-declining groups—
older white voters, the working classes, and school leavers. As Britain’s 
two main parties reoriented themselves to focus on the rising liberal 
groups, a mainstream political consensus emerged on such issues. This 
socially liberal outlook regards diversity as a core social strength; sees 
discrimination by gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation as a key 
social evil; regards national identity as a matter of civic attachment, not 
ethnic ancestry; and thinks that individual freedoms matter much more 
than communal values.6 The increased political prominence of this out-
look is not just a matter of electoral expediency. It reflects the typical 
worldview of the university-educated professionals whose weight in the 
electorate is rapidly increasing, and who have also come to dominate 
the top tiers of politics and society. Politicians of all stripes have not 
adopted these positions solely to win votes. Most come from the profes-
sional middle classes and share the values it holds. 
Such values, however, contrast sharply with the more nationalistic, 
communitarian, and inward-looking outlook of the declining segments 
of the electorate: the older, white, and working-class voters who left 
school with few qualifications. Such “left-behind” voters feel cut adrift 
by the convergence of the main parties on a socially liberal, multicul-
tural consensus, a worldview that is alien to them. Among these voters, 
national identity is linked to ancestry and birthplace, not just institu-
tions and civic attachments, and Britishness is far more important to 
them than it is to liberal graduates. The “left-behind” groups are more 
focused on order and stability than on freedom and diversity, so the very 
things that social liberals celebrate—diversity, mobility, rapid change—
20 Journal of Democracy
strike them as profoundly threatening. Their policy preferences reflect 
this: They favor not only harsh responses to criminals and terrorists who 
threaten social order, but also tough restrictions on immigration, as they 
do not want a more diverse and rapidly changing Britain. 
Intolerance plays a role here too. Such voters tend to emphasize a 
more exclusive and exclusionary sense of national identity and to hold 
more negative stereotypes of any minority group that falls outside this 
identity. But intolerance is not the whole story. Many of the things that 
such voters value—order, stability, tradition—are valid and legitimate 
social ideals. They are just profoundly different from the values of the 
liberal consensus that has emerged over the past twenty years. Main-
stream politicians attached to that consensus were not only ignoring the 
values and priorities of the “left-behind,” they were actively promoting 
a vision of Britain that the “left-behind” voters found threatening and 
rejected. 
Igniting the Bonfire: Immigration, Europe, and UKIP
By the early 2000s, then, Britain had a growing pool of electorally 
marginalized, politically disaffected, and low-skilled white working-
class voters whose values and identity attachments were increasingly at 
odds with the mainstream liberal consensus. Such “left-behind” voters 
were available to form the nucleus of a new political movement, but 
they needed an issue and a party to crystallize their inchoate discontent 
and to mobilize it into electoral politics. Both arrived in the mid-2000s 
with the emergence of immigration as a central controversy, and a re-
sulting surge in support for a new political challenger that swiftly be-
came the primary vehicle for public opposition to EU membership, mass 
immigration, ethnic change, and the socially liberal and cosmopolitan 
values that had come to dominate the political establishment.
The spark that lit this remarkable conflagration was a fateful deci-
sion by Tony Blair’s New Labour government in 2003. Unlike most 
other EU member states in Western Europe,7 Britain opted not to impose 
temporary restrictions on the inward migration of EU nationals from the 
so-called A8 states in Central and Eastern Europe that were due to join 
the EU in 2004—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hun-
gary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Britain’s low unemployment and 
growing economy attracted EU migrants in much larger numbers than 
originally forecasted by the government. Net migration to Britain had 
already been rising before the decision to admit the A8, but the influx 
from Central Europe further boosted the numbers and made controlling 
them more difficult. Net migration rose from 48,000 to 268,000 per an-
num between 1997 and 2004 and continued to rise, topping 300,000 in 
the years immediately before the referendum.8 The statistics regarding 
net migration, which was the focus of government policy targets, rou-
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tinely dominated political debate and coverage of immigration in the 
media. The A8 influx produced a strong reaction among voters, who 
even prior to the accession treaty had grown concerned about rising im-
migration. The share of voters naming migration as one of the nation’s 
most important issues increased from under 3 percent at the start of 1997 
to around 30 percent in 2003 and then to over 40 percent toward the end 
of 2007.9 After that point, immigration was routinely named by voters 
as one of the top two most important issues, even in the depths of the 
financial crisis and the recession. By the time of the EU referendum, 
immigration had been at the top of the political agenda for well over a 
decade, something which had never happened before in British politics. 
While the surge in migration produced a sea change in public opinion, 
the links between the numbers and public attitudes are not straightfor-
ward. Rising numbers of migrants did generate stronger public concern, 
but they did not produce across-the-board opposition. Public support for 
the settlement of skilled workers and the acceptance of foreign students 
at British universities remains high. Opposition has been focused on 
migrants whose economic contribution is less clear, including asylum 
seekers, migrants joining their families, and unskilled workers.10 Nor is 
migration seen as simply a matter of economics. In Britain, as elsewhere 
in Europe, the strongest and most inflexible opposition to migration has 
come from voters who see it as a source or symbol of rapid social change 
that threatens traditional identities and values.
This latter form of anti-immigration sentiment is not new. British 
immigration debates have long been intertwined with public anxieties 
over race and identity, with public hostility in earlier decades directed 
at black and South Asian migrants from former imperial territories in 
the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, who began arriving in large 
numbers from the 1950s onward. Yet starting in 2004, the focus of anxi-
ety moved to the large new flow of migrants from EU states in Central 
and Eastern Europe. As a result, anti-immigration voters came to see 
migration (and the social changes that it brought) as an issue closely 
bound up with Britain’s EU membership—a development that made the 
2016 referendum very different from the only previous referendum on 
Britain’s relationship with Europe, held in 1975. The majority of voters 
in favor of reduced immigration realized that the EU was a key obstacle 
to achieving that goal, and consequently became more skeptical about 
the merits of continued EU membership.11 Anxieties about the perceived 
effects of migration on public services, welfare, and identity were also 
fueled by a strident and populist tabloid press, which adopted a relent-
lessly negative stance on the issue. Front-page stories blaming EU mi-
grants for social ills, and demanding action to control their numbers, 
became a regular occurrence after 2004. 
Though both Labour and the Conservatives were keenly aware of 
the growing public disquiet about immigration, neither could find an 
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effective response given the external constraints on policy.12 Labour 
made efforts to limit or restrict migrant access to welfare benefits and 
to toughen up the asylum system, but it also defended immigration as 
economically and socially beneficial. The party made repeated pledges 
to “listen” to voter concerns on the issue, but it was unable or unwilling 
to propose policies that would significantly reduce migration, not least 
because doing so would have risked antagonizing socially liberal voters 
and activists. Ahead of the 2010 general election, Conservative Party 
leader David Cameron appealed directly to anxious voters by pledging 
to reduce net migration to “the tens of thousands.” This was an ill-ad-
vised promise to make, as EU treaty rights guarantee the free movement 
of EU nationals, making this degree of control over migration impos-
sible so long as Britain remained in the EU. Throughout the Conser-
vative–Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010–15, efforts to 
restrict net migration by curbing inflows from outside the EU were con-
tinually offset by continued migration from within the EU, including 
new arrivals from countries in Southern Europe that were grappling with 
economic crises and unemployment, as well as migrants from newer 
EU members, Romania and Bulgaria, who gained unrestricted access to 
Britain in 2014.
Since 2004, then, the politics of immigration has featured persis-
tent and strong public concern, a consistent demand for greater control 
of inflows, and repeated failures by different governments to meet this 
demand, despite repeated pledges to do so. This had a predictable and 
clear impact. Voters anxious about immigration lost faith in the ability 
of the main parties to manage the issue effectively, and became dissatis-
fied with the entire political system.13 Public concerns about immigration 
began to drive growing opposition to EU membership, which was seen 
as the source of uncontrollable migration inflows and the obstacle to ef-
fective policy responses. Moreover, this mix of immigration anxiety and 
growing distrust was concentrated among those socially conservative and 
less-educated white voters who already felt left behind by rapid social, 
economic, and value changes. Immigration was the political catalyst for 
these voters, symbolizing the value divides that put them at odds with the 
mainstream liberal consensus, eroding their trust in the traditional parties 
and the political system, and providing an opening for a new challenger.14
The UKIP, founded in 1993 as a single-issue, Euroskeptic party, had 
little success in its first decade. Yet by 2015, it had become the most 
successful new party in English politics for a generation.15 By fusing its 
original message of withdrawal from the EU with strident opposition to 
immigration, the UKIP was able to catch the angry public mood, and 
its leader Nigel Farage and his self-anointed “People’s Army” quickly 
attracted rising support, particularly after the 2010 election. The UKIP 
replaced the Liberal Democrats in opinion polls as the third most popu-
lar party in 2012, established a significant presence in local councils in 
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2013, won a plurality in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, 
and attracted two defecting Conservative members of Parliament. In the 
2015 general election, it secured 12.6 percent of the national vote, al-
though Farage’s failure to convert this support into any seats in Parlia-
ment prompted him to resign (briefly) as leader. Analyses of the UKIP’s 
support revealed that it came mainly, though not exclusively, from older 
white social conservatives who often had few educational qualifica-
tions, had voted Conservative in the past, opposed immigration and EU 
membership, and felt dissatisfied with the two main parties. 
The UKIP’s rise, alongside repeated rebellions by Euroskeptic back-
bench Conservative MPs, was a key factor that led David Cameron in 
2013 to commit to holding a referendum on Britain’s continued EU 
membership if he were to secure a majority government at the 2015 
general election. When the surprise Conservative majority materialized, 
Britain was put on a path toward the 2016 referendum, an outcome that 
also prompted Farage to return as UKIP leader in order to campaign for 
a “Leave” vote. 
The Referendum Campaign
In February 2016, Cameron completed an intensive round of ne-
gotiation over the terms of Britain’s EU membership. He did obtain 
a few concessions. These included an opt-out from the declaration in 
EU treaties committing member states to an “ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe,” as well as an “emergency brake” whereby a 
member state could apply to the European Commission for permission 
to suspend benefit payments to EU migrants if they were placing too 
great a burden on social services. Though these were not major reforms, 
Cameron declared that they were sufficient to justify recommending that 
Britain remain a member of the EU.
Two months later, in April 2016, the Electoral Commission (the United 
Kingdom’s independent elections regulator) chose “Vote Leave,” a group 
dominated by Euroskeptic Conservatives, as the officially designated 
campaign in favor of leaving the EU. This greatly disappointed the rival 
“Leave.EU” campaign, a more populist group founded by major UKIP 
donor Aaron Banks and endorsed by UKIP leader Nigel Farage. Official 
designation came with the right to spend up to £7 million, free television 
broadcasts, the right to distribute campaign material by mail at public ex-
pense, and £600,000 in public funding. These institutional supports gave 
the Vote Leave campaign, which wanted to highlight issues of sovereign-
ty and the costs of EU membership, a major advantage over the Leave.EU 
campaign, which favored a strong focus on immigration. 
Vote Leave recruited support from senior Conservative cabinet min-
isters and MPs, including Boris Johnson (the former London mayor 
and the Conservatives’ most popular politician), as well as a handful 
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of Labour politicians. Meanwhile, the UKIP organized rallies and a bus 
tour that tended to focus on Labour-voting areas of the country. Labour 
leader Jeremy Corbyn was widely criticized throughout the campaign 
for failing to deliver an unambiguous and passionate case for Remain 
and for having a fractious, semi-detached relationship with the official 
Remain campaign, “Britain Stronger in Europe.” Among Labour MPs, 
dissatisfaction with his leadership was fueled by a television interview 
in which Corbyn rated his passion for remaining in the EU at “about 7 
or 7.5 [out of 10]” and by repeated difficulties in getting Corbyn to en-
gage with referendum campaigning. Corbyn’s diffidence was noticed by 
voters, with one campaign poll suggesting that almost half of all Labour 
voters did not think that Labour wanted to remain in the EU.16
The Remain and Leave campaigns focused on different issues, reflect-
ing the profiles and priorities of their supporters. The official pro-Remain 
campaign focused on the economic risks of leaving the EU, including the 
claimed negative repercussions that withdrawal from the single market 
would have on the economy, on Britain’s image as an open and globalized 
marketplace, and on the financial costs to firms and households. These 
relentless appeals to economic interest were reflected in claims by the 
Treasury that each household would be £4,300 worse off annually if the 
electorate voted for Brexit. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) only 
days before the vote warned that leaving the EU would harm British living 
standards, stoke inflation, and by 2019 reduce economic output by 5.5 per-
cent. A further warning from Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 
said that such an outcome would necessitate harsh public spending cuts 
and tax increases. Businesses also intervened. One letter from 198 business 
leaders, including 36 from the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 firms, 
warned that Brexit would threaten jobs and put the economy at risk.
Vote Leave, Leave.EU, and other Euroskeptic groups focused instead 
on arguments about immigration, EU threats to national sovereignty, 
and the need to redirect Britain’s contributions to the EU into public 
services at home, especially the National Health Service (NHS). Vote 
Leave claimed that EU membership cost Britain £350 million per week 
(“Enough to build a brand new, fully-staffed NHS hospital every week”); 
that more than half of net migration came from the EU; and that voters 
should reject the further enlargement of the EU to include countries such 
as Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey. Meanwhile, the UKIP and 
the UKIP–allied Leave.EU campaign maintained their traditional focus 
on immigration, attracting controversy during the final days of the cam-
paign by putting up a billboard showing a long line of refugees under the 
headline “Breaking Point.” The billboard was launched on the same day 
as the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox, who had allegedly been killed by a 
white man shouting “Britain First!”17
Although polling throughout the campaign suggested a tight race, the 
consensus among the commentariat and the financial markets was that 
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voters would in the end stick with the status quo. Political betting mar-
kets gave Remain a 93 percent chance of victory in the minutes before 
the first results were announced, and UKIP leader Nigel Farage even 
gave a concession speech early on during the overnight count, blaming 
the defeat he expected on a surge in voter registration among young 
people. What instead followed in the early hours of June 24 was the big-
gest shock to the British political system in living memory. 
The Pollsters Miss the Mark
Near the end of the campaign, seven polling companies released their 
final polls. Six of the seven reported a lead for Remain (one poll re-
ported a striking 10-point Remain lead), and the one exception underes-
timated the Leave margin of victory.18 The Leave win with 51.9 percent 
of the vote was larger than any of the late polling had expected. The lead 
for Leave was even stronger in England, where 53.4 percent voted for 
Brexit. Local authorities across the length and breadth of England, from 
rusting postindustrial Labour heartlands to prosperous Conservative 
suburbs, reported big majorities for Leave on very high turnouts—the 
overall turnout was the highest recorded in a U.K.-wide vote since 1992. 
Local jurisdictions with large numbers of pensioners and a history of 
voting for the UKIP (such as East Dorset, Chiltern, East Hampshire, and 
Wealden) recorded very high turnouts and “Leave” shares. The Leave 
vote surpassed 70 percent in fourteen jurisdictions, many of which had 
been cultivated by the UKIP in the past. This was particularly so in 
parts of eastern England with large concentrations of “left-behind” vot-
ers (such as in Boston, South Holland, Castle Point, Thurrock, and Great 
Yarmouth). Leave also attracted majority support in approximately 70 
percent of Labour-held areas, winning especially strong backing in 
poorer northern postindustrial areas (for example, Hartlepool, Middles-
brough, Blackpool, and Doncaster). 
At the other end of the spectrum stood London, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, and the university towns. Of the fifty local jurisdictions where 
the vote to remain in the EU was strongest, only eleven were not in Lon-
don or Scotland, and most of these were areas with large universities. In 
a country divided on unfamiliar lines, London—home to the political, 
business, and media elite—was profoundly at odds with the country that 
it dominates and overshadows. London wholeheartedly embraced Eu-
rope, even as most of England emphatically rejected it. The same story 
played out in microcosm across the nation. Diverse urban areas and uni-
versity towns returned large Remain majorities, but found themselves 
swimming against the tide, as the bulk of English local jurisdictions 
backed Leave. 
Support for Brexit showed strong class, education, and ethnic com-
ponents. The biggest majorities for Leave were in the least diverse lo-
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cal jurisdictions, or in those with large concentrations of working-class 
voters and voters with few educational qualifications. Local experiences 
with migration also mattered: Areas that had experienced significant 
demographic change as a result of inward EU migration over the past 
ten years registered larger Leave votes, after controlling for their other 
characteristics. At the individual level, support for Leave was 30 points 
higher among people with only “GCSE-level” qualifications (awarded 
to school leavers at sixteen) than it was for people with a university 
degree. Leave also was far stronger among those who felt anxious over 
the effects of immigration, who identified as English rather than Brit-
ish, and who generally exhibited socially conservative and authoritarian 
values.19 Support for Brexit also overlapped very strongly with support 
for the UKIP in earlier elections, suggesting that the vote for Leave 
was driven at least in part by the same forces. Aside from this strong 
relationship at the aggregate level, research on individual Leave voters 
has suggested that 67 percent had at one time or another before the 2016 
referendum expressed an interest in voting for the UKIP.20 
The Political Fallout
The immediate reaction to the result was chaotic. Britain’s currency 
and government bonds went into freefall. Yet the financial instability 
was dwarfed by the extraordinary political fallout. Within hours of dis-
covering that his great gamble had failed, David Cameron announced 
his resignation, leaving the task of implementing Brexit to his successor. 
Days after the result, a wave of resignations and a vote of no confidence 
in Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership by Labour MPs incensed at his failure to 
campaign effectively for EU membership triggered a crisis in the La-
bour opposition that would run for the entire summer. 
The following week, the front-runner to succeed Cameron, former 
mayor of London Boris Johnson, withdrew from the leadership race after 
his Conservative ally in the Leave campaign, Michael Gove, unexpect-
edly announced that he would run for the job. Gove himself withdrew the 
following week after failing to secure sufficient support among his fel-
low MPs. Just as things seemed to be quieting down, Nigel Farage unex-
pectedly resigned as UKIP leader, triggering a rolling internal battle for 
control of the party that had done most to drive the Euroskeptic agenda.21 
Ten days after the country had voted for Brexit, the three largest parties 
in England were all embroiled in simultaneous leadership crises. 
Order was gradually restored as the summer wore on. New Conserva-
tive prime minister Theresa May, who had backed Remain but had been 
largely absent during the campaign, was elected unopposed in mid-July 
after her last remaining competitor, vocal Brexiteer Andrea Leadsom, 
withdrew following several gaffes and missteps. Labour leader Jeremy 
Corbyn was reelected by the Labour membership in September after a 
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bruising internal contest, while the UKIP’s internal feuding continues at 
the time of this writing (November 2016), as the party, having achieved 
its founding objective, tries to agree on a new direction. As the dust be-
gins to settle, all the parties are struggling to come to terms with a politi-
cal landscape that was profoundly changed by the events of June 23 and 
with a political agenda set to be dominated for years by the most com-
plex and high-stakes international negotiation in modern British history. 
Whatever approach the government pursues in implementing the ref-
erendum verdict, the vote for Brexit has accelerated the polarization of 
values, outlooks, and political priorities that increasingly divides uni-
versity-educated cosmopolitans from poorly qualified nationalists. The 
coming period of difficult and protracted negotiations between Britain 
and the EU will most likely entrench the divides separating England’s 
socially liberal youth from its socially conservative pensioners, and its 
diverse and outward-looking big cities from its homogeneous and intro-
spective small towns and declining industrial heartlands. The 2016 vote 
laid bare the depths of the divisions between these groups and placed 
them on opposite sides of the defining political decision for a genera-
tion. Both traditional governing parties now have to wrestle with inter-
nal conflicts between Leavers and Remainers, and between those who 
now want to prioritize single-market access and those who want to pri-
oritize stronger curbs on free movement and migration. 
The position of Prime Minister Theresa May during the early months 
of her premiership suggests an effort to reorient the Conservative Party 
toward traditional social conservatism and the English nationalism that 
often unites Leave voters. May starts in a strong position—her Con-
servative Party has consistently led Labour in opinion polls by double 
digits since the referendum vote—but such a strategy could put at risk 
the support of more liberal, Remain-voting Conservatives in the longer 
run. Labour under Jeremy Corbyn has wholeheartedly embraced the so-
cially liberal values of Remain voters, but without much enthusiasm for 
the EU, at least from the party’s leader and his allies. As a result, the 
Remain cause, which British Election Study data suggest emerged from 
the trauma of the referendum defeat as a much clearer and more salient 
political identity for its proponents, lacks coherent or credible support 
from the leaders of the two main parties.22 This is a politically unstable 
situation. Demands for a clear voice for Remainers are likely to grow 
as the problems and uncertainties of Brexit accumulate, and if neither 
traditional party is able to provide them with one, then at some point 
they may seek it elsewhere.
Leave voters also pose problems for the parties. Their clear prefer-
ence for immigration controls on EU workers is considered by many 
political leaders in Europe to be incompatible with Britain’s retaining 
full access to the single market. This puts Prime Minister May in the 
difficult position of trying to negotiate a new agreement with the EU 
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that maximizes access to European markets for the City of London, 
while also including the more radical immigration reform that Leave 
voters clearly want to see. May’s challenge is magnified by the fact that 
few comprehensive trade agreements have ever been resolved in a short 
timeframe, and the Brexit negotiation is likely to be more complex than 
most. A transitional deal may ease pressures, but it would be unlikely (at 
least initially) to deliver the immigration restrictions that Leave voters 
expect to see. On the other hand, if the government prioritizes swift ac-
tion on immigration control over access to European markets, this could 
have large and unpredictable consequences for the economy. It is pos-
sible that any viable deal will produce a significant backlash, regardless 
of its contents. Many Leave voters have very low trust in the political 
system, yet also very high expectations that Brexit will not only deliver 
specific policy goals, but will reverse the entrenched social and econom-
ic changes they oppose. Such expectations may be impossible to meet. 
A reckoning would then be inevitable, and would open a new window 
of opportunity for radical right-wing populists. Managing the inevitable 
disappointment and disruption that will follow Brexit will be the current 
government’s biggest challenge, while stoking and mobilizing a popular 
backlash may be the UKIP’s best opportunity for post-Brexit renewal.
The Electoral Challenge of Tomorrow
Although the political shifts that culminated in Brexit appear to have 
been remarkably rapid, the fuel that Euroskeptics and Leavers ignited 
to spectacular effect had been accumulating for a long time. A slow but 
steady alteration in the social structure of the electorate and the resultant 
shift in the focus of political competition away from the working class 
and toward the middle class had opened up a clear and growing gap in 
the electoral market. The origins of the vote for Brexit can be traced 
back over decades to changes in British society and politics that, by the 
time of the 2016 referendum, had left a growing segment of older, white, 
nationalist, and socially conservative voters feeling marginalized from 
mainstream politics and opposed to the socially liberal values that have 
become dominant in their country. 
Repeated failures by both main parties to respond to public demands 
for controlled migration stoked a high-profile and deeply polarizing debate 
that thrust latent conflicts over identity and nationalism, social values and 
social change, into the center of British politics. Particularly from 2010 
onward, these conflicts were mobilized by the U.K. Independence Party, 
which campaigned relentlessly to fuse these anxieties with the question of 
Britain’s EU membership. This has been deeply disruptive for a political 
system in which electoral battles for at least the past two decades had fo-
cused instead on questions of economic stewardship and the management 
of public services, with the two main parties split primarily over redistribu-
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tion and the relative roles that should be played by the state and the mar-
ket. The 2016 referendum and the vote for Brexit exposed and deepened a 
newer set of cleavages that are largely cultural rather than economic.
Across the Western democracies, the divides between nationalists 
and cosmopolitans, liberals and conservatives, and cultural traditional-
ists and multiculturalists cut across old divisions and present established 
parties with new and difficult challenges. In Britain, negotiating an ac-
ceptable exit deal with the EU is the primary policy challenge for the 
government today. But for all the country’s political parties, articulating 
and responding to the divisions that were laid bare in the Brexit vote will 
be the primary electoral challenge of tomorrow. 
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